The U.S. demographic transition by Jeremy Greenwood & Ananth Seshadri
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
The U.S. Demographic Transition
Perfect Capital Markets
by Jeremy Greenwood and
Ananth Seshardi
0118Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to
the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views
stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World Wide
Web: www.clev.frb.org.Working Paper 01-18 October 2001
The U.S. Demographic Transition
By Jeremy Greenwood and Ananth Seshadri
Between 1800 and 1940 the United States went through a dramatic demographic transition. In
1800 the average woman had seven children, and 94 percent of the population lived in rural areas.
By 1940 the average woman birthed just two kids, and only 43 percent of populace lived in the
country. The question is: What accounted for this shift in the demographic landscape? The
answer given here is that technological progress in agriculture and manufacturing explains these
facts.
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Picture the U.S. in 1800. The vast majority of the populace lived in rural areas;
94 percent did. The average white woman gave birth to 7 children. Now, move
forward in time to 1940. Only 43 percent of the population lived in rural areas, and
the average white woman birthed 2 kids. The demographic transition is shown in
Figure 1.
What was the force underlying this decline in fertility? The answer is technolog-
ical progress. Two factors are relevant here. First, between 1800 and 1940 real wages
grew about 5 fold. This increased the time cost of children in terms of consumption
goods. America was sparsely populated as it entered the 19th century, just 4.5 people
per square mile. Parts were “so thinly scattered” that one writer advised immigrants
that “no assistance worthy of notice can be obtained from others outside of the fam-
ily.” So, children undoubtedly made an important contribution to the early household
economy. With industrialization part of the utility ﬂow accruing from children could
be replaced less expensively by purchasing goods and services on the market.
Second, the role of agriculture in economy declined over this period. This con-
tributed to the decline in fertility since, historically, women in the rural economy had
a higher fertility rate than those in urban areas. In 1830 it took a farmer 250-330
hours to produce 100 bushels of wheat; by 1890 this was reduced to 40-50 hours with
the help of a horse drawn machine; only 15-30 hours was required with the aid of
a tractor in 1930; by 1975 large tractors and combines had reduced the labor input
needed to just 3-4 hours. Similarly, it took 236 and 439 hours to produce a bushel of
corn and bale of cotton in 1840. This had dropped to 8 and 32 hours by 1970. Less
people were needed to feed the nation, given the relatively low income elasticity of
agricultural goods. So while agriculture accounted for about 80 percent of the labor
force in 1810, only about 30 percent of the population was employed in this sector by
1910, and just a paltry 2 percent in 1997. With economic progress other sectors of
the economy began to outpace agriculture. Agriculture’s share of output fell from 41
2percent in 1840 to 2 percent in 1997.
II. The Model
Environment.— The world is described by a two-sector overlapping-generations
model. An individual lives for three periods, one as a child and two as an adult. He
consumes two goods: agricultural and manufacturing. The relative price of agricul-
tural goods is p. Young adults work. They have one unit of time. Unskilled young
adults earn the wage w, while skilled ones receive v. Each young adult must save for
his old age since no one works when old. The gross interest rate on savings is r.A
young adult must decide how many children, q, to have, and whether or not to skill
them. There is a ﬁxed cost, τ, associated with raising each child. Endowing a child
with skills costs t units of time.
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with sgn(ζ)=sgn(ξ). Here c and c0 denote the individual’s consumption of manufac-
tured goods when young and old, respectively, while a and a0 represent consumption
of agricultural goods. A person derives utility from the quantity, q, and quality of
children. A parent picks the level of education, e ∈ {0,1}, for his child; a choice of
e =1corresponds with endowing the child with skills. Quality is measured by the
wage that a child will earn as a young adult. A skilled child will earn v0 when he
grows up, while an unskilled kid will receive w0.







where oc denotes output, z is total factor productivity, and kc and sc are the inputs










where oa is output, x is total factor productivity, and ka, ua,a n dsa are the inputs of
capital, unskilled labor and skilled labor. Observe that unskilled labor is used only
in the agricultural sector. Manufacturing output can be used either for consumption
or for capital accumulation. The aggregate stock of capital, k, evolves according to
k
0 = δk + i,
where i is investment and δ is the factor of depreciation.
The Unskilled Parent.— The choice problem facing an unskilled parent with un-
skilled kids is
U(w,w
0,p,r)= m a x
c,a,c0,a0,q
{(ψ/γ)(c + c)
















+ qτ = w.
Denote the optimal number of children and the level of ﬁrst-period savings that arise
from this problem by quu and buu. Likewise, the problem facing a unskilled parent
with skilled children will read
V (w,w
0,p,r)= m a x
c,a,c0,a0,q
{(ψ/γ)(c + c)
















+ qw(τ + t)=w.
Represent this parent’s optimal number of children and ﬁrst-period savings by qus and
bus. Clearly, all unskilled parents will choose to skill their children if V (w,w0,p,r) >
4U(w,w0,p,r), and all will choose not to when V (w,w0,p,r) <U (w,w0,p,r).I f
V (w,w0,p,r)=U(w,w0,p,r) then some unskilled parents may pick to skill their
children while others don’t. Skilled parents face a similar decision. Now, in the equi-
librium modelled here the time path of wages adjusts so that all unskilled parents
will be indiﬀerent between endowing their children with skills or not. Skilled parents
always (weakly) prefer to skill their oﬀspring. Let qss and bss denote the number of
children and level of savings that are chosen by a young skilled parent.
Population Dynamics.— Suppose the number of young adults is n.O u t o ft h i s
population some fraction µ will be unskilled, implying that the fraction 1 − µ will
be skilled. Some fraction, σ, of unskilled parents will choose to endow their children
with skills. Hence, the number of young adults next period, n0, will be given by
n
0 = {µ[(1 − σ)quu + σqus]+( 1− µ)qss}n.





Firms.— Firms in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy are


















c − (r − δ)kc − vsc}.
These problems imply that all factors will get paid their marginal products.
Equilibrium.— In equilibrium various market-clearing conditions must hold. For
instance, savings by the young must equal next period’s capital stock, k0,s ot h a t






5Likewise, the demand for unskilled labor must equal its supply implying
ua = µn{(1 − σ)[1 − quuτ]+σ[1 − qus(τ + t)]}.
Observe that the supply of unskilled labor is reduced by the time young adults spend
on childcare and education.
III. Findings
Can the model replicate the decline in fertility that occurred between 1800 and
1940? This question is quantitative in nature. To answer it the model must be solved
numerically. To do this, the model’s parameters are assigned the values presented in
Table 1. Before proceeding onto the quantitative analysis, exactly how much tech-
nological progress was there in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors between
1810 and 1940?
Technological Progress in Agriculture and Manufacturing. Take agriculture ﬁrst.
Total factor productivity (TFP) grew at 0.51 percent per year between 1810 and 1900.
Its annual growth rate fell to 0.26 percent in the interval 1900 to 1929 and then rose
to 0.94 percent over the 1929-to-1940 period. Hence, by chaining these estimates to-
gether, it is easy to calculate that TFP increased by a factor of 1.00491001.0026291.009411 =
1.95 between 1800 and 1940. TFP in the nonagricultural sector — labelled manufac-
turing — rose at a faster clip. It grew at 0.79 percent per year between 1800 and 1840
and at an annual rate of 0.73 percent over the period 1840 to 1900. Its growth rate
then picked up to 1.63 percent across 1900 to 1929 and to 1.78 percent from 1929 to
1940. Therefore, over the period 1810 to 1940 nonagricultural TFP grew by a factor
of 1.0079401.0073601.0163291.017811 =4 .11.1
A. Steady-State Analysis
The Decline in Fertility.— Now, suppose that at time 1 (some period just before
1800) the economy is initially in a steady state with x1 =3 .77 and z1 =3 .77.T h e
6model then predicts that on average there will be 3.48 kids per parent in the economy,
exactly the number observed in 1800.2 In the model’s countryside there are about
3.78 kids per parent versus 2.06 in its cities. This compares with 3.7 and 2.5 in the
data. Furthermore, in the data about 50 percent of parents had more than 3.5 kids;
55.7 percent of families in the artiﬁcial economy do. Last, about 82.43 percent of the
model’s population work in country, the same as at the beginning of the 19th century.
L i k e w i s e ,a s s u m et h a ta tt i m eT (sometime after 1940) the model somehow ends
up in a new steady state with xT =1 .95x1 and zT =4 .11z1. Now there is just slightly
more than 1 kid per parent, the same as in 1940. Rural families are a little bigger (1.33
kids per parent) than urban ones (1.05). Only 14.92 percent of the population work in
agriculture, the same as in 1940. Table 2 decomposes the decline in aggregate fertility
into its three sources: the decline in rural fertility, the decline in urban fertility, and
rural-to-urban migration.3 The model matches the U.S. data quite well.
Intuition.— So why does fertility drop with economic progress? Consider the
marginal costs and beneﬁts from having a child. To do this focus on the ﬁrst-order
condition associated with the number of children that arises out of the optimization
problem of, say, an unskilled parent who has chosen to have unskilled kids. This




0ξ = ψ(cuu + c)
γ−1wτ
(where again the subscript uu denotes the actions of an unskilled parent with un-
skilled kids). The marginal cost of a child is made up of two components: the wage
rate, w, and marginal utility of manufactured goods, ψ(cuu + c)γ−1. The former rises
with economic development while the latter falls. The less concave utility is in man-
ufactured goods (as measured by the exponent γ) the faster the marginal cost of a
child will rise over time. The marginal beneﬁt of a kid also rises with wages through
the quality term, w0ξ. The more concave utility is in child quality (i.e., the smaller
is ξ), the less will be the beneﬁt of an extra child as wages rise. Now, suppose that
the marginal cost of children increases relative to the beneﬁt. The drop oﬀ in fertility
7will be bigger the less concave utility is in child quantity, since marginal beneﬁtt h e n
declines less in quantity. By making utility concave enough in child quality, at least
relative to manufactured goods, a decline in fertility can be generated.
Additionally, less unskilled labor is needed as agriculture declines. Rural parents
increasingly choose to skill their kids so that the latter can work in manufacturing.
Agriculture’s share of income will decline faster, the more concave utility is in agricul-
ture consumption relative to manufacturing consumption (or the smaller is ω versus
γ). With economic progress wages rise, and this makes labor more expensive relative
to capital. Increasingly expensive unskilled labor can be more easily be replaced by
less-expensive capital, the greater is the degree of substitutability between capital and
brawn in the agricultural production function. Hence, capital-brawn substitutability
(or a high ρ) promotes rural-to-urban migration.
Last, the constant terms a and c in utility play a very important role in getting
a high expenditure share for agricultural goods, and a low one for manufacturing
goods, in the early stage of development. The constant a operates to increase the
marginal utility of agricultural goods at low consumptions levels. For example, drop a
from 0.25 to 0.20. The marginal utility of agricultural goods falls. As a consequence,
agriculture’s share of GDP in the initial steady state decreases from 0.68 to 0.62. The
c term does the opposite for manufactured goods. To illustrate its eﬀect reduce c from
1.35 to 0.01. Here agriculture’s share of GDP in the initial steady state falls from
0.68 to 0.35. Since the marginal utility of manufacturing goods rises, less resources
are devoted to having children too. Fertility plummets from 3.48 to 0.98.4
Other Facts.— In the model the real interest remains constant across the two
steady states at about 6.36 percent, a reasonable value. As the model economy
develops with technological progress agriculture’s share of output falls from to 68.36
percent to 20 percent. In 1840 agricultural production made up about 40 percent
of U.S. output. This had declined to 5 percent by 1950. There is a decline in the
model’s investment-to-GDP ratio from about 17.8 percent to 12.1 percent. At the
same time labor’s share of income declines from 82.43 percent to 60.8 percent, which
8contradicts the conventional wisdom that it either remained constant or rose. This is
due to assumed degree of substitutability between capital and brawn in the production
agricultural production function. With economic development, brawn is replaced by
capital in agricultural production. Capital’s share of income thus rises.
B. Transitional Dynamics
The analysis of comparative steady states suggests that the model may be capable
of explaining the U.S. demographic transition. Will the drop oﬀ in fertility, however,
be too fast or too slow? To answer this question, time paths for TFP similar to those
found in the U.S. data for the 1800-1940 period are fed into the model. Speciﬁcally, let
{x1,x 2,x 3,···,x 8,···} = {3.77,4.16,4.58,5.05,5.57,6.15,6.47,1.95 × 3.77,···} and
{z1,z 2,z 3,···,z 8,···}= {3.77,4.41,5.15,5.97,6.91,7.99,11.04,4.11×3.77,···}.T h i s
time path is counterfactual in the sense that no technological advance is assumed to
take place after 7 periods (or after 1940). The sudden death in technological progress
doesn’t appear to do any damage to the analysis.
The upshot of this experiment is presented in Figure 2. Both urban and rural
fertility decline smoothly between 1800 and 1940, much like the data. The share of
manufacturing in employment rises in a steady fashion, too. Note that model has
not reached its ﬁnal steady state by 1940 (i.e., it takes longer than 7 periods for the
model to converge).
IV. Postscript — Literature Review
The macroeconomics of population growth started with classic papers by Gary
S. Becker and Robert J. Barro (1986) and Assaf Razin and Uri Ben-Zion (1975).
The ∩-shaped pattern of fertility that has been observed over epochs in the Western
world has been analyzed in interesting work by Oded Galor and David Weil (2000).
Matthias Doepke (2000) has also examined the relationship between long-run growth
and fertility. He studies the impact of education policies and child labor laws on
9fertility. Cristina Echevarria (1997) and John Laitner (2000) have developed well-
known models of secular sectoral shifts. The process of U.S. regional convergence,
whereby the agricultural south caught up with the manufacturing north, has been
modelled by Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman (2001). In a sense the
current work blends the fertility and sectoral shifts literature together.
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12FOOTNOTES
1. The estimates for the growth rates of agricultural productivity from 1800 to
1900 come from Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman and William N. Parker (2000, Table
6.1). The estimates for both agricultural and nonagricultural TFP for the 1900-
to-1929 and 1929-to-1940 periods are taken from Historical Statistics of the United
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Series W7 and W8). Last, the estimates of the
growth rate of technological progress in the nonagricultural sector are backed out
using economy-wide TFP and sectoral share data taken from Robert E. Gallman
(2000, Tables 1.7 and 1.14) in conjunction with the Atack et al (2000) agricultural
estimates.
2. In the real world each child has two parents while in the unisexual model each
kid has one parent. Hence, in the U.S. data the fertility rate for women should be
divided by 2 to get the rate per parent. If the model is calibrated to get 7 kids per
parent (the female fertility rate in 1800) then the rate of growth for the population
is far too high (10 percent per year versus the 3 percent in the data).
3. The decline in fertility is decomposed as follows: Total fertility, f,i saw e i g h t e d
average of rural fertility, r, and urban fertility, u, where the weights π and 1 − π are
the fractions of the total population living in rural and urban areas. Thus, f =






2 (π0−π)]. The ﬁrst term in
brackets gives the contribution of the decline in rural fertility to the total decline in
fertility, the second measures the amount arising from the decline in urban fertility,
while the third term shows the amount due to migration. The ﬁgures for the U.S. are
taken from Wilson Grabill, Clyde V. Kiser and Pascal K. Whelpton (1958, Table 8).
4. To highlight the importance of a and c,s e tω = γ = ζ = ξ =0(i.e., assume
logarithmic preferences). Adjust the initial levels of TFP to get back the circa 1800
steady state. Fertility across the two steady states falls from 3.5 to 1.35, which is just
a little worse than the simulated model.
13TABLE 1. Parameter Values
Tastes Technology
Agr. α =0 .09,ω = −0.05,a =0 .25 ν =0 .5,ρ =0 .6,λ =0 .8,x 1 =3 .77 = xT/1.95
Man. ψ =0 .5,γ =0 .01,c =1 .35 κ =0 .33,z 1 =3 .77 = zT/4.11
Fert. χ =0 .08,ζ = −0.08,ξ = −0.08 τ =0 .06,t=0 .04
Misc. β =0 .9420 δ =( 1 .0 − 0.1)20
TABLE 2. Decomposition of the Decline in Fertility
R.-to-U. Migr. Dec. in R. Fert. Dec. in U. Fert.
U.S. Data, 1810-1940 20.2% 56.0% 23.8%
Model 28.3% 50.0% 21.7%



































































































Figure 1: The U.S. Demographic Transition, 1800-1950






































































Figure 2: The Demographic Transition, Model
16